The Korean armistice of 1953 and its consequences - part I by Hoare, James & Daniels, Gordon
The Korean Armistice of 1953 and its Consequences 
Part I 
 
 
 
 
James Hoare:  The Korean Armistice North and South: The Low-Key Victory 
 
Gordon Daniels: The British Press and the Korean Armistice: Antecedents, 
         Opinions and Prognostications 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     The Suntory Centre 
     Suntory and Toyota International Centres 
     for Economics and Related Disciplines 
     London School of Economics and Political Science 
Discussion Paper   Houghton Street 
No. IS/04/467   London WC2A 2AE 
February 2004   Tel.: 020-7955 6698 
Preface 
 
The Suntory Centre, STICERD, held a symposium on 15 October 2003 to re-
examine the armistice of 1953 which followed the Korean War. The intention was to 
discuss the reaction of those countries who were both immediately and more 
distantly concerned in the light of its 50th anniversary. 
 
The following papers were presented: 
 
Dr James Hoare on the Korean perspective 
 
Dr Rana Mitter (Institute of Chinese Studies, University of Oxford) on the Chinese 
perspective 
 
Professor Takahiko Tanaka (Hitotsubashi University and academic visitor, LSE) on 
the Japanese perspective 
 
Dr Gordon Daniels (formerly of the University of Sheffield) on the reactions of the 
British press on the war and its aftermath 
 
The papers by Dr Hoare and Dr Daniels appear in Part I of this discussion paper 
while those of Professor Tanaka and Dr Mitter will appear shortly in Part II. 
 
The Centre is grateful to the authors for allowing us to reproduce their papers here. 
 
The symposium was held in association with British Association of Korean Studies 
and the Japan Society, London. 
 
February 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstracts 
 
Hoare: Both North and South Korea claim victory in the Korean War. Yet neither 
makes much of the ending of the war in July 1953, and both have had problems 
coming to terms with the reality of the war. The reality is that both suffered so much 
in a conflict that achieved little that formal celebrations seem inappropriate. 
 
Daniels: The outbreak of the Korean war in 1950 and the ferocious fighting which 
took place affected Britain, whose army took part in the war. This essay records the 
different shades of opinion expressed in its various newspapers/journals. 
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The Korean Armistice North and South: The Low-Key Victory 
James Hoare 
 
This is less an academic paper than a reflection on how both Koreas, North and 
South, handle the anniversary of the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement at 
Panmunjom on 27 July 1953, an event which put a temporary halt to hostilities on 
the Korean peninsula. Although it attempts to cover both North and South Korea, it 
began as a look at the North Korean treatment of the 27 July anniversary, and that is 
perhaps still the strongest element in the paper. 
 
The origins of this paper, and indeed of the seminar, lie in my return to Pyongyang in 
July 2001 after a visit to Britain. I had been appointed as the first British official 
representative to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – North Korea – in 
January 2001, and had taken up residence in Pyongyang in May 2001. I was now 
returning to North Korea after a rushed visit to the United Kingdom, where I had ran 
into problems over medical clearance that had delayed my return. Indeed, at one 
point, it looked as though I would not get clearance and would not return. But the 
problems were overcome, and my wife and I set out for Pyongyang on 25 July. We 
had only one night’s pause in Beijing, and then it was straight on to Pyongyang on 
27 July, since it was planned that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Chief 
Clerk, the title by which the head of the administration was then known, would arrive 
on 28 July so that a formal opening of the embassy could take place on 30 July. 
 
I must confess that, despite three years living in Seoul and various pieces of work on 
the Korean War over the years, it was only when we arrived at the airport in 
Pyongyang and my colleagues said that there was going to be 'night dancing' that 
evening to mark the anniversary of the Korean Armistice Agreement, did it dawn on 
me that this was the 48th anniversary of the end of the Korean War. Yet in this 
apparently most military of countries, the anniversary was to be marked by a low-
key, civilian event, not the large-scale type of military parade with which most people 
associate the North Koreans.1 
 
Yet so it was. There had been no parade of tanks, no lines of marching soldiers. 
Instead, the end of the Korean War was marked by rather sedate circle dances, with 
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large groups of young Koreans taking part. For the most part, the girls looked bored 
and many of the young men seemed drunk, but it was a good-natured affair, with 
occasional attempts to drag the watching foreigners into the dances.  
 
July 2002 passed in the same manner, even though in the meantime, relations with 
the United States, always presented as the main enemy of North Korea, had 
deteriorated badly, and much anti-American sentiment was to be found in the 
posters on the streets and in the media. And even 2003, with the 50th anniversary of 
the end of the war and problems with the United States having developed into a 
major crisis, the armistice was once more marked in relatively low-key fashion. There 
were no parades, although there were wreath-laying ceremonies, as on all such 
occasions, at Kim Il-sung’s statue on Mansudae Hill in the heart of Pyongyang, and 
also at the monument to the Chinese People’s Volunteers. Despite foreign media 
attempts to cast a sinister shadow over the events, these were a rerun of earlier 
years, with young people holding 'festive events' in Pyongyang’s Kim Il-sung square, 
an art exhibition dealing with the war, and veterans telling their stories at the 
People’s Palace of Culture, a rather gaunt building used for meetings. The only 
difference from earlier years was that the anti-US statements were markedly harsher 
than what I had seen and heard in 2001 and 2002. Given the sharp deterioration in 
relation since the visit by US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly in October 
2002, and the effective ending of the 1994 Agreed Framework and the related KEDO 
project, a certain increase in the sharpness of tone seemed to me inevitable.2 
 
All this left me thinking why this should be so. When I thought back to my time in 
Seoul (1981-85), it struck me that the Republic of Korea (South Korea) had also 
been surprisingly reticent about celebrating the end of the Korean War, even though, 
like the North Koreans, the South claimed that the armistice had been a victory. 
 
A discussion with the then Republic of Korea Ambassador, Ra Jong-il, himself a 
scholar of the Korean War, led to the idea of a seminar. The ambassador indicated 
that he would be willing to take part.  
 
Much has changed since then. Ambassador Ra moved on to a new and more 
challenging position that will have left him little time to consider the 1953 armistice 
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and the idea of marking the occasion grew into something more than a seminar 
about how the armistice is or is not marked by the two Koreas. But that is still the 
subject I would like to probe.  
 
In fact, an examination of the record shows that from the very beginning, neither 
side, despite both claiming victory in the war, has ever made a great deal of the 
armistice itself, and neither has really celebrated the event from the very beginning. 
In 1953, North Korea marked the armistice with a military parade and speeches, but 
thereafter does not seem to have done so. In the lists of holidays and festivals that 
are celebrated in North Korea, 27 July does not feature. It is not listed with such 
‘festivals of the people’ as the birthdays of Kim Jong-il on 16 February, or Kim Il-sung 
on 15 April, or 25 April, celebrated as Army Day. These are proper holidays, with 
time off work and, when possible, extra rations. By contrast, 27 July seem always to 
be a low-key event.   
 
One possible measure of how North Korea views events may be found by examining 
its postage stamp issue.3 North Korea issues stamps in abundance. Nowadays, a 
single year may see hundreds of stamps issued, which may have more to do with 
revenue-raising than with the letter writing habits of the North Koreans. It was more 
restrained in its early days, though even then, there were signs of a generous issue 
policy. In 1953 alone, for example, apart from definitives, 13 other stamps were 
issued. The single stamp issued on 28 July 1953 to mark victory in the Korean War 
thus seems unusually low-key, even by the practices of the time. 
 
It was 10 years before the end of the war would be marked again. A pair of stamps in 
1958 marked the departure of the Chinese ‘People’s Volunteers’, whose entry into 
the war in the autumn of 1950 was also commemorated by a double issue in 1960. 
But although stamps were by now flowing thick and fast off the presses, the end of 
the war was not commemorated until 1963, when again only a single, low value 
stamp appeared.  
 
In the 1970s, the DPRK stamp world took off in spectacular fashion. Now stamps 
appeared showing such unlikely North Korean heroes and heroines as Rembrandt 
and Joan of Arc. Yet no stamp appeared to mark the armistice anniversary in 1973, 
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and although the newly refurbished Korean War Museum featured, that was not until 
December 1973 and no attempt was made to link the issue with the end of the 
Korean War. In the early 1980s, the British Royal wedding between the Prince and 
Princess of Wales featured, as did the latter’s 21st birthday. That coincided with the 
30th anniversary of the end of the war, but of the 95 stamps issued, again only a 
single low value stamp marked the occasion. 
 
The 40th anniversary did see a bigger splash. Two stamps appeared, each in a 
miniature sheet, emphasising Kim Il-sung’s role in the war. Now, it must be 
assumed, there will be nothing until the 60th anniversary in 2013. 
 
Other forms of commemoration are also all relatively low key. It is true that a 
Museum of the Victory in the Fatherland Liberation War, as the conflict is formally 
described in the DPRK, was organised in 1953, and refurbished and reopened in 
1974. This understandably makes much of the earlier part of the war, especially the 
highly successful campaigns of June-September 1950, but it appears to be relatively 
silent on the armistice.4 Neither does it appear to be much visited. On the three or so 
occasions that I have been there since 1998, there has been scarcely another visitor 
in sight, though the vast size makes it difficult to judge, and also limits what one can 
actually see on any given visit. (On my various trips, I saw virtually the same rooms, 
with particular emphasis on the diorama of the battle of Taech’on.) 
 
Panmunjom, where the armistice was actually signed, makes more of the event. 
Guides, drawn from the Korean People’s Army, tell the story of the war and the 
armistice negotiations as a victory for the North and a defeat for the United States, 
and the site of the actual signing is treated as a major historical monument. 
However, few North Koreans seem to visit Panmunjom, which is of course within the 
highly sensitive Demilitarized Zone. Booklets produced for sale in a variety of 
languages are available, but they tend to emphasise alleged 'United States' 
violations of the armistice agreement, rather than the signing of the agreement 
itself.5 
 
The main formal monument to the war was not constructed until 1993-94, on a site 
adjacent to the War Museum, beside the Potang River. The area still has some low-
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key life size statues dating from the 1950s, but the new monument now 
overshadows these. The new monument consists of a huge gate beyond which 
stand two structures, one of which has a piece by Kim Il-sung, and the other a poem. 
Beyond them, a series of heroic statues depicting various scenes from the Korean 
War led up to a huge figure depicting ‘Victory’. To a Western eye, it is all very 
reminiscent of Soviet era war memorials in Europe; indeed, ‘Victory’ could be taken 
from the Soviet war memorial in Budapest. Korean tour parties come to visit this 
monument, and it has also become one of the scenic backdrops around the city 
against which newly-wed couples are photographed. Whistle-blowing officials make 
sure that nobody goes too close to the statues.6  
 
Other monuments are not very prominent. In the 1950s, a tall statue of a soldier 
carrying a machine gun stood on Haebang Hill in the city centre, and visiting 
delegations laid wreaths there. But the area is now within the Korean Workers’ Party 
compound, and off limits to ordinary people. Whether the monument survives is not 
known. It, or a version of it, may be preserved in the Fatherland War Museum.7 
There is no Korean War cemetery as such, though some of the leaders are 
remembered in the Revolutionary Martyrs’ Cemetery on Mount Taesong on the edge 
of Pyongyang. Others may be buried in the Patriotic Martyrs’ Cemetery just outside 
the city, but this receives much less attention than the Revolutionary Martyrs.  
 
The Chinese People’s Volunteers have a monument not far from the Chinese 
Embassy, erected in 1959, and ceremonies are held there each year to mark their 
intervention in the war. Otherwise, the only visitors to it are Chinese. A memorial 
book lists the names of Chinese officers killed in the conflict. There are also 
supposed to be two Chinese Volunteers’ cemeteries near the city, one of which 
contains the grave of Mao Zedong’s eldest son, Mao Anying, but we did not find 
either.8 The Soviet cemetery, in the city not far from the diplomatic quarter, has some 
Korean-war era graves, and Soviet forces took part in the air war in Korea, but it is 
not known how many of these are graves of combatants. While ceremonies are held 
there to mark Victory in Europe Day and Victory over Japan Day, nothing seems to 
be held to mark the Korean war – not surprising, since officially the Soviet Union was 
not a participant.9  
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Outside Pyongyang, it is rare to come across any commemoration of any aspect of 
the war. Given that most of the North Korean military successes were in the South 
after the conflict began in June 1950, this is not surprising. For the Korean People’s 
Army, most military action in the North was confined to retreating in the face of the 
UN advance from September-November 1950. The subsequent counter-attack from 
November 1950 onwards was largely a Chinese effort, as North Korean forces 
regrouped and rebuilt. While North Korean forces did take part in later fighting, this 
was in the largely stalemate conditions that prevailed from summer 1951 until the 
armistice. Areas where fighting then took place are still today, on both sides of the 
demilitarized zone, within militarily restricted areas. 
 
A museum marking alleged United Nations atrocities, as usual presented as United 
States forces only, has been built at Sinch’on in South Hwanghae Province. Foreign 
visitors, especially groups that are regarded as friendly, are taken to visit. In the 
vicinity, a variety of murals/posters shows one of the alleged massacres, with women 
and children being forced off a bridge and then machine-gunned in the water.10 Even 
this museum appears to date only from 1998, and its creation may reflect the re-
discovery of an alleged massacre at Nogun-ri in South Korea. Otherwise, while 
guidebooks list revolutionary sites and battlefields associated both with Kim Il Sung 
and Kim Jong Il, the Korean War goes uncommemorated and unmarked. Wartime 
cemeteries that are known to have existed once have long since disappeared, often, 
it seems, built over in the 1950s as North Korea industrialised.11 
 
In some ways, the war is far more marked in South Korea than it is in the North. 
There are many war memorials, mostly around Seoul where the heaviest fighting 
took place in 1950 and 1951. They include a British one, dating from 1957, and 
others commemorating Dutch, Australian and New Zealand forces. Oddly enough, 
only the United States appears to be missing. Some battle sites are marked, 
including some defeats. Inch’on makes much of General MacArthur’s successful 
amphibious landing in September 1950, but not many miles away, the unfortunate 
Task Force Smith, hastily assembled in Tokyo in June 1950 and unsuccessfully 
thrown into Korea to help stop the North Korean advance, has its monument outside 
Suwon. There has been a United Nations cemetery at Pusan since the end of the 
war, and even though it is closely pressed by the expanding city of Pusan, it is still 
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lovingly cared for by both its custodial staff and local children.12 Citizens of the 
Republic of Korea who died in the war are commemorated in the National Cemetery 
in Seoul. That said, there is something of the same low-key treatment of the 
anniversary in the South as in the North. 27 July is not a national holiday, and there 
are no parades or special ceremonies. Even at the truce village of Panmunjom, not 
much is made of the armistice. Attention is instead focussed on North Korean 
atrocities and infiltration attempts. Perhaps since the actual area where the armistice 
was signed is in the North, as are the table and other relics, this reticence is 
understandable. 
 
Curiously enough, it was not until 1994 that South Korea opened its War Memorial, 
which now stands in Yongsan-ku, an area that is very much the military centre of 
Seoul. Like its Australian counterpart, to which it seems to owe some of its 
inspiration, this is both a war memorial and a museum. Before its construction, a 
privately organised museum devoted solely to the Korean War functioned on Yoido 
Plaza, not far from the National Assembly building. It was very much the inspiration 
of one man, Kap Chong-chi, who devoted much of his life to activities involving both 
South Korean and foreign Korean War veterans.13 Once the decision was made to 
erect an official museum, Mr. Kap was instructed to remove his exhibits, which are 
now displayed in the south of the country. 
 
Although the War Memorial is clearly strongly linked to the Korean War, that is not its 
sole function. Indeed, the museum seems not wholly at ease with the Korean War, 
which is not the biggest section of the museum. Instead, it attempts to build up a 
long Korean military tradition, stretching back into antiquity and forward to South 
Korean involvement in the Vietnam War. Given that the military tradition is not one of 
Korea’s strong points, there are times when the museum seems to struggle with its 
remit, and the whole project has been the subject of some opposition.14 
 
The real problem of course is that despite the claims on each side about victory, the 
armistice in 1953 was not a victory for anybody. At best, three years of war had done 
nothing more than confirm the division of the peninsula. In reality, both sides lost. 
The armistice itself was the product of two years hard and bitter negotiations, with 
each side trying to wrong-foot the other. The course of the negotiations was marked 
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by long interruptions during which savage fighting continued right to the last minute. 
Not surprising, therefore, that at the time of the signing, contemporise noted that 
there was no rejoicing, no celebrations. This was not a victory but only a pause.15 
 
The war had huge effect on the peninsula.16 Three million Koreans were killed, 
wounded or missing, while 10 million families, one third of the population of the 
peninsula, were broken up. Thirteen million Koreans, or 43% of the population in 
1950, were directly affected by the war. The damage was particularly fierce in North 
Korea, which bore the brunt of the fighting after September 1950, and which was 
effectively without air cover except in certain remote areas. According to US 
statistics, the United States’ Air Force used 386,037 tons bombs, 32,357 tons 
napalm, 313,600 rockets, and 167 million machine gun rounds against the North. 
The war had also been marked by atrocities on both sides. 
 
In 1953, the North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung said that the country’s economy was 
totally destroyed. It had lost 8700 industrial plants, 370 chongbo (906,500 acres) of 
farmland, 600,000 houses, 5000 schools, 1000 hospitals and 260 theatres (sic). In 
1953, the North’s national income was 69.4% of that of 1950; electricity production 
17.2% of 1949, and coal 17.7% of 1949. There had been a huge loss of able-bodied 
men either killed or who fled South. 
 
South Korea was also in a bad way. It had lost 17,000 plants, businesses, and 
factories, 4000 schools, 600,000 homes, and GNP declined by 14% in the war. Total 
property damage was estimated at US $2 billion, or the same as GNP in 1949. 
Effectively, therefore, apart from the end of the fighting, both sides found themselves 
in the summer of 1953, with nothing to mark and nothing to celebrate. For both North 
and South Korea, others had won many of their successes in battle. What do you 
celebrate if your existence has been saved by outside intervention, whether by the 
United Nations or by China, and your hopes of achieving a reunified peninsula have 
been thwarted by those same saviours? No wonder neither side makes much of the 
armistice.17 
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The British Press and the Korean Armistice: 
Antecedents, Opinions and Prognostications 
 
Gordon Daniels 
 
North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel on 25 June 1950, barely five years 
after the end of the European War, and less than five years after Japan’s surrender; 
a time when the realities and perceived 'lessons' of the Second World War remained 
close presences in the minds of British politicians and journalists. Prime Minister 
Attlee, Foreign Secretary Bevin and leader of the Opposition Churchill had all been 
colleagues in the wartime coalition cabinet.1 Thus the notion that cross-border 
aggression by dictators constituted the greatest threat to peace was widely 
accepted. This concept was often linked to the hope that collective security – through 
multilateral treaties or the United Nations – would preserve peace and international 
order. 
Britain’s experience of two world wars, and centuries of colonial and commercial 
activity, made her leaders and commentators deeply aware of distant Asian issues. 
These were seen as interlinked to global rivalries, not as fragmented local difficulties. 
Furthermore Britain’s concession of independence to India, Pakistan, Ceylon and 
Burma, her defence of Malaya against Communism, and her colonial development 
schemes, led many politicians, journalists and officials to believe that Britain had a 
sensitivity to Asian nationalism which others had not.  For some, particularly on the 
political left, Britain’s recognition of Communist China, in January 1950 was further 
evidence of this sensitivity – if the Chinese Revolution was interpreted as a 
nationalist, as well as a Communist, triumph. 
It was against this background that much of the British press greeted and welcomed 
United States, and soon after, United Nations action to defend the Republic of 
Korea. Less than a year before, in August 1949, The Times had claimed that no 
such 'full scale attack was at all likely.'2 But when the 38th parallel was crossed it 
declared that the conflict was 'much more than a civil war,' rather it was a deliberate 
challenge to the United States and the United Nations in a place only a hundred 
miles from occupied Japan.3 The Times was not the only serious organ to support 
American action, and British approval of it. The Economist declared 'The leaders of 
the free world have shown that they have the will to resist aggression, that they are 
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ready to run risks now to stop militant Communism from picking off its victims one by 
one.'4 However this writer cautioned 'The purpose of the action is limited….The 
purpose is to stifle the explosion…not widen the area of conflict.' (U.N.) 'forces will 
not operate north of the 38th parallel… proof...that this is a defensive… operation.'5 
The Times, like Churchill and Attlee saw Communism as a global threat. It also 
placed much blame on Moscow for giving its blessing to Pyongyang’s attack. 
Nevertheless, as early as July 1950 the interdependence of non-Communist states, 
and the problem of limited resources both became significant themes in The Times’ 
commentaries. One writer now called for 'better Atlantic defence,'6 while the 
implications of the Korean conflict for global political strategy became a recurring 
theme in British writing. In August a Times leader writer pointed out that Russia 
would be suited if 'China became embroiled' in the war and the United States was 
pulled away from the Middle East and Europe.7 
By November 1950 MacArthur’s United Nations forces had advanced far beyond the 
38th parallel and faced Chinese troops near the Manchurian border. This led The 
Times to again express fears that United States and European forces would be 
drawn away from Europe, with a corresponding weakening of Western defence.8 As 
Chinese 'volunteers' advanced southward apprehension grew that conflict with China 
could spread well beyond the Korean peninsula. Such fears were deepened by 
President Truman’s suggestion, on 30 November, that the use of nuclear weapons 
was not impossible.9 In this atmosphere of crisis Prime Minister Attlee flew to the 
United States to seek reassurances regarding American intentions. According to The 
Economist these Anglo-American conversations resolved a 'crisis of confidence'10 
but these talks indicated another sphere in which global anti-Communist policy was 
indirectly threatening the condition of the allies.  Already raw material shortages, and 
rearmament programmes were driving up the prices of important commodities. This 
trend was deeply troubling to British leaders who were acutely aware of their balance 
of payments difficulties. In response to these concerns Truman and Attlee agreed to 
'jointly distribute existing supplies of raw materials' in the common interest and 'jointly 
set about increasing these supplies.'11 However, this agreement suggested the 
establishment of a complex quasi-planning mechanism, which would be extremely 
difficult. 
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By the end of 1950 newspapers such as The Times saw that events in Korea might 
now be linked to Chinese Communist claims for membership of the United Nations, 
and control of Formosa (Taiwan). Clearly, Chinese military intervention in Korea had 
drastically damaged Sino-American relations, making any such concessions 
unacceptable to Washington.12 Conversely these new issues provided ready 
grounds for left-wing press attacks on American policies. Such attacks were to 
continue with increasing ferocity following the return of the Conservative Party to 
power in October 1951. American plans for economic sanctions against China also 
disturbed British journalists who feared that Sino-American tension might provoke a 
military attack against Hong Kong or at least damage its trade. 
In late February 1951 The Times again presented somewhat cautious views, 
suggesting that United Nations troops should not re-cross the 38th parallel.13 In May 
following MacArthur’s dismissal, this far from radical journal joined left-wing critics in 
attacking the behaviour of the deposed Supreme Commander.14 By this time The 
Times had come to modify its military proposals and favoured a limited United 
Nations advance to the waist of the Korean peninsula.15 
In July 1951 truce talks finally began between American and Communist military 
negotiators. This was a forum unlike the United Nations – where Britain had no 
significant influence. Furthermore the British press had no meaningful access to 
Chinese or North Korean political processes – which were key factors in the talks. 
Communist writers in the London Daily Worker suggested that they understood what 
lay behind Chinese actions, but their writings were often little more than eulogies of 
Chinese Communist conduct. Less rigidly committed journalists such as Times 
leader writers could speculate more freely. Would there be a Chinese offensive to 
coincide with the Japanese peace conference in San Francisco? Were periods of 
military calm a cover for a likely ‘larger and wider explosion’?16 Yet mere speculation 
could generate little detailed or substantial thought. 
Nevertheless by October 1951 the certainties or near certainties of the past were 
clearly fragmenting. Earlier notions of Stalin as supreme puppet master were 
complicated by China’s central importance in the war and its diplomacy.17 Even more 
disturbing was a new confusion in United Nations policy. Indeed, in October 1951 
The Times suggested that China would not accept a ceasefire until the United 
Nations had clarified its own aims, and conveyed these to the Communist side.18  
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Soon after – only sixteen months after the war’s outbreak – it was being described 
as merely 'cruel and wasteful'. On 28 November 1951 The Times declared 'no one 
suggests that the United Nations should try to overwhelm North Korea to the Yalu'19 
It was now clear that 'the United Nations have every reason to seek a military 
armistice.' 
Two months later, in January 1952 The Times took an even more critical view of the 
Korean conflict. It now described it as 'the Wrong War' which, far from stabilising a 
situation, threatened, indirectly, to undermine the French position in Indo-China.20 
Even more threatening was Senator Taft’s talk of the need for a MacArthur style all-
out war on Communist China.  By now The Times’ editorial staff were highlighting 
another complexity in the situation, the contradiction between the original U.N. 
objective – a unified Korea – and the need for more realistic aims. This dilemma was 
described as a conflict between ‘collective security’ and ‘traditional diplomacy’.21 
Churchill apparently feared, as Attlee had done in 1950, that fighting in Korea could 
threaten a diversion of Western forces, from Europe and the Middle East. It was now 
being claimed – with little recognition of Japan’s importance – that Korea was 'not 
vital to Western interests.'22 
Throughout 1952 propaganda themes dominated news about Korea. Chinese 
charges of germ warfare evoked incredulity among contributors to The Times.23 They 
were treated with the maximum possible credulity in the pages of the Daily Worker. 
Similarly, rioting by Communist prisoners in Koje provided further material for this 
pro-Communist organ – and created a measure of embarrassment in liberal 
newspapers.24 Doubts about the West’s commitment to South Korea were also 
deepened by the erratic behaviour of Syngman Rhee. The Times saw him as a ‘most 
capable administrator’ who was abusing his power.25 
As American bombing of North Korea drew closer to the Yalu it became clear that 
Britain had no meaningful role in Washington’s military decision making. In the 
continuing war London and Washington might be partners in name, but in very little 
else.26 Despite Anglo-American differences, which were exploited by such open 
Communist supporters as the Dean of Canterbury, The Times praised the United 
States’ conduct in the protracted truce negotiations. On 14 July 1952 its leader writer 
praised the Americans’ monumental patience in participating in eight hundred hours 
of talks with adversaries who were not only Communists but 'also Orientals'.27 
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Despite China’s increasingly powerful position in Korea, and signs that Moscow 
might be sympathetic to some form of truce, the suspicion remained that the Soviet 
Union could somehow benefit from continued fighting. Yet 1953 was to see 
significant political changes. On 5 March Stalin died, and as a truce in Korea seemed 
more likely, The Times began to discuss the uncertainties which an end to hostilities 
might bring. In a leading article entitled 'Economics of the Olive Branch' it noted that 
progressive developments in the truce talks, and the possibility of lower arms 
production, had already reduced some share values, and prices of raw materials. 
The possibility of rising unemployment and deflation now misted the international 
horizon.28 
Perhaps the very proximity of a truce agreement focussed journalistic attention on 
the detailed conduct of the negotiations. When the leading American negotiator 
General William K Harrison, appeared to rule out a significant role for Asian states in 
post-truce mechanisms, the Manchester Guardian and the Daily Worker achieved a 
rare unity of view. Both criticized the heavy handed American negotiator. The 
Manchester Guardian went much further than criticism in suggesting that American 
military negotiations should be replaced by civilian diplomats – to improve the West’s 
international reputation.29 There was even the suggestion that British negotiators 
might have a useful role to play. This widespread criticism of Harrison recalled the 
strident attacks on MacArthur in the first years of the Korean War. One other allied 
figure frequently unified the British press in an unlikely manner: the South Korean 
leader Syngman Rhee. His release of Northern prisoners appeared to threaten both 
the truce process and the reputation of the allies.30 Yet even Rhee had some 
journalistic support. In a skilfully argued contribution to Punch entitled 'Unfortunate 
Mr. Rhee', the Roman Catholic Conservative Christopher Hollis characterised the 
Korean leader as a quasi-Churchillian defender of South Korea’s national interest, 
who merited respect.31 
If the Korean War had been ended by a multilateral peace conference, perhaps 
Britain’s role might have been significant and the comment of the British press might 
have been more substantial. As it was British journalists were merely commentators 
from outside, lacking detailed information or access to major negotiators. 
Nevertheless the truce of 27 July 1953 inspired diverse and interesting reflections. 
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Typical of comments on what seemed to be an interim settlement was the article 
'Brighter Hope of Armistice' in the conservative Daily Telegraph. This stated 
'Prospects of a lasting peace are as yet obscure and the hope of Korean unity may 
be insubstantial but a firm truce in Korea on honourable terms would not only be an 
immense advantage to the United Nations but also to the South Koreans 
themselves, who will deserve and receive large assistance in restoring their 
shattered country.'32 
This mingling of political and economic issues was also apparent in the Manchester 
Guardian’s leading articles 'Cease Fire' of 27 July and 'Trade in Peace' published 
two days later. The former declared. 'It is thirty-seven months since the North 
Koreans marched in, twenty-four since it became clear that neither side could win an 
outright victory and the truce talks began, and only two since the negotiators of both 
sides went into secret session and a truce at last became probable. The war ends 
almost where it began.'33 
This liberal paper’s recognition of the role of the United Nations was to be expected.  
It clearly commended the fact that this was the first time 'nations have come together 
to resist flagrant aggression.' It claimed that United Nations leadership had been 
essential and without this the struggle could not have come to a 'fair issue' – though 
the simple notion of ‘fairness’ in such a complex and tragic circumstance appears 
somewhat insensitive. Again, characteristically, the Manchester Guardian praised 
India’s role in resolving the dispute over prisoners of war. President Truman was 
also complimented on his creative statesmanship, but Korea’s ruined and still divided 
condition was also acknowledged. On 29 July the Guardian’s leader writer brought 
an air of qualified optimism to its analysis of the economic future.  It declared 'for the 
last three years production and trade all over the world has certainly been stimulated 
by rearmament and the supply of the fighting forces in Korea. If more peaceful 
conditions develop it will be impossible to keep spending on defence up.' This article 
also suggested that American voters would be unwilling to continue to support such 
high military spending. Conversely, it hoped that peace might bring an increase in 
trade, particularly between the Eastern and Western blocs. Overall the Manchester 
Guardian believed that a recession in the United States was less likely than in 1951 
– though the sterling area might suffer from falling prices for such raw materials as 
rubber, tin, jute, sisal and copra.34 
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The Financial Times also expressed guarded optimism regarding the future.  In 'After 
Korea' it claimed that international cooperation had halted aggression for the first 
time but 'only to contain it in a limited geographical area.' The Financial Times now 
perceived possible improvements in the economic situation declaring 'between 
March and June the Dow index had only fallen by twenty five points.' It also noted 
that the overwhelming importance of private industry in the United States suggested 
that government procurements were not the decisive determinants of its economic 
health. The Financial Times also questioned whether the prosperity of most Western 
states was solely based on arms production. 
Like the liberal Manchester Guardian it hoped for the expansion of East-West trade 
and 'especially trade with China.' For the Financial Times the prolonged nature of the 
truce talks had itself made a positive contribution to prosperity.  It commented 'they 
have enabled the immediate economic effects of the cease fire to be spread over 
several months and its more remote effects to be considered without haste.' More 
than anything else the Financial Times noted that the truce in Korea would add 
further to the easing of international tension which was, in part, symbolised by the 
death of Stalin.35 
The Sunday newspaper, The Observer, also recognised that the truce agreement 
would contribute to a more general improvement in international relations.36 Perhaps 
the realities of military realpolitik were expressed, most directly by the conservative 
Daily Telegraph. In 'Truce at Last in Korea' it stated: 
'Massive bombing has made North Korea a liability to Communist China and 
Chinese troops have suffered a rotation of demoralising martyrdom from the 
air.' Recognising the real element of force which lay behind the truce it 
declared 'nothing the enemy can do will induce the United Nations to abandon 
their stricken and heroic ally.'37 
In contrast to these severe, if accurate judgements the Daily Worker saw the 
agreement as a triumph for the masses.38 On the day following the truce it reprinted 
the statements of various left-inclined religious and cultural leaders who were 
advocates of peace. These included the 'Red Dean' of Canterbury, the Reverend 
Donald Soper and the distinguished Irish dramatist Sean O’Casey. O’Casey was 
quoted as saying 'The thing now is for war everywhere, in Indo-China, Kenya, 
Malaya to go back to hell.'39 
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This celebration of the truce proved extremely short. Within a week the Daily Worker 
accused John Foster Dulles of plotting to restart the war.40 In contrast more 
moderate left-wing newspapers remained positive. The News Chronicle saw the 
truce as a symbol of a worldwide change in Communist policy; a development which 
might lead to a truce throughout Asia.  It also called for restraint in any criticism of 
the United States.41 The Labour Party newspaper the Daily Herald looked beyond 
the truce to a broader process of pacification in which recognition of the People’s 
Republic of China would be a creative element.  It declared 'China must be admitted 
to the UN at the earliest possibility. There can be no hope of a settled world 
relationship while that great country is kept out of the Council Chambers.' Labour 
anti-Americanism and sympathy for a perceived egalitarian regime in China 
combined to fuel such suggestions.42 
Not surprisingly few could imagine that such a lengthy and expensive conflict would 
be followed by something as anti-climactic as a simple truce. Even Punch in its 
lilliputian characterization of the condition of the peninsula 'Breathing Space' 
suggested a possibility of future change.43 However, it was the strongly pro-
American Economist which tried hardest to prise open the future. In a sense this 
magazine perceived something which most other newspapers had failed to see - the 
immense power of leaders of small countries in critical situations. Syngman Rhee 
was a notable example.44 More concretely The Economist looked towards a political 
conference which was expected to follow the cease fire. For all its political 
sophistication this journal saw diplomatic recognition of Beijing as nothing more than 
something which would suit the Kremlin’s book.45 The possibility that recognition 
might help in the collection of data or in engineering Sino-Soviet friction seemed 
beyond its contemplation. 
The Economist clearly recognised how difficult the mechanics of a post-truce 
conference might be. Obvious problems included the construction of an agenda, and 
deciding which states should be constituent members. Perhaps The Economist’s 
pessimism was too dark in suggesting that Turkish or Colombian aspirations could 
be significant obstacles to progress.46 Its journalists were, however, perceptive in 
depicting the blurring which had entered policy making towards Korea. One 
contributor declared: 
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'The United Nations have been fighting in theory for the conception of a united 
Korea; no one at any rate outside the Communist capitals, intended in 1945 
that Korea should be permanently divided. With the recent implacable 
Communist opposition in the North…it had come to be thought that some form 
of partition was the only workable solution – until Mr. Syngman Rhee made it 
clear during the past few weeks that the South would not accept a permanent 
division.  Hence, if the allies are going to discuss the future of Korea, it is now 
clear – that they must go into the conference committed to unity…Yet…since 
the actual union of North and South does not at present look like being 
feasible, some formula may have to be found which while accepting union in 
principle, still does not make peace dependent on its being put into practice 
immediately.'47 
Despite all these subtleties and complications The Economist saw the successful 
truce talks as a possible model for the future 'filing down of a great mass of 
disagreement into the smooth and polished page of compromise.'48 Unfortunately 
this was not to be. 
Whatever its failings the British press in its serious corridors, sought manfully to 
interpret the political and economic complexities of the Korean War and its 
aftermath. These included such unprecedented features as U.N. military action and 
the fighting of a limited war. In failing to provide a formula for successful Korean 
reunification the British press merely reflected the icy realities of the peninsula. 
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